John KAYE, Ecclesiastical History of the Second and Third Centuries (1845). Chapter 3. pp. 131-167.


CHAPTER III.

ON THE STATE OF LETTERS AND PHILOSOPHY.

MOSHEIM commences his internal history of the Church in each century with an account of the state of letters and philosophy. In the second century his observations principally relate to the new system of philosophy: or, to speak more accurately, to that mixture of Platonism and Christianity which was introduced by Ammonius Saccas at Alexandria. On this subject the writings of Tertullian afford no information. Not that he was unacquainted with the tenets of the different sects----his works on the contrary show that he had studied them with diligence and success: nor that he entertained that mortal enmity to philosophy and letters which Mosheim imputes to the Montanists in general----1 for he appears even to have thought that the philosophers, who opposed the polytheism of their countrymen, were in some measure inspired by the spirit of truth:----2 but |132 he clearly saw, and has, in his controversial writings against the heretics, pointed out the pernicious consequences to the interests of Christianity, which had resulted from the attempt to explain its doctrines by a reference to the tenets of the philosophers. 3 "They indeed by a lucky chance might sometimes stumble upon the truth, as men groping in the dark may accidentally hit upon the right path: but the Christian, who enjoys the benefit of a revelation from heaven, is inexcusable, if he commits himself to such blind and treacherous guidance."

Although, however, the writings of Tertullian afford us no assistance in filling up the outline sketched by Mosheim of the state of learning and philosophy in the second century, an examination of his own philosophical or metaphysical notions will, we trust, supply some curious and not uninteresting information. We will begin, therefore, with the Treatise de Testimonio Animae: the object of which is to prove that the soul of man bears a natural testimony to the truth of the representation, given in Scripture, of the Divine nature and attributes. 4 In a short exordium, Tertullian points out the inconsistency and perverseness |133 of the heathen, who usually paid a blind deference to the decisions of the Philosophers; but renounced their authority at the very time when they approached most nearly to the truth----when their doctrines most closely resembled those of Christianity. He then proceeds to address the soul; enumerating at the same time the opinions entertained by the philosophers respecting its origin. 5 "Stand forth," he says, "O soul, whether, as the majority of philosophers affirm, thou art divine and immortal, and therefore incapable of falsehood; or whether, according to the solitary opinion of Epicurus, thou art not divine, because mortal, and therefore under a stricter obligation to speak the truth; whether thou art brought down from heaven, or taken up from the earth; whether thou art formed from numbers or from atoms; whether thine existence commenced with that of the body, or thou wast subsequently introduced into the body: whatever thine origin, and in whatever manner thou makest man a rational animal, capable of sense and knowledge---- stand forth."----"I do not, however," he adds, "address myself to the soul in an artificial state, such as it becomes after it has been tutored in the schools of philosophy; but to the soul in its natural state, possessing only that knowledge which it has |134 either within itself, or learns immediately from its Creator."

The 6 testimony which, according to Tertullian, the soul bears to the unity of God, consists in exclamations like the following, which burst forth involuntarily from the mouths even of Pagans, in common conversation: "God grant that it may be so" ----"If God will." "How happens it," asks our author, still addressing the soul, "that instead of naming any one of the numerous Deities who are the objects of heathen worship, you use the word 7 Deus: and thus unconsciously bear testimony to the existence of one supreme God?" In like manner the soul evinces its knowledge of the attributes of God, of his power and goodness, by exclaiming, "God bless you; God is good; I commend you to God; God sees all things; God will repay:" as it 8 evinces its knowledge of the author of evil, by the execrations which it pronounces against daemons. 9 By |135 the fear also of death, by its innate desire of fame, and by involuntary expressions of feeling respecting the dead, it declares its consciousness that it shall exist in another state, and its anticipation of a future judgment.

"Such 10 is the testimony which the soul bears to the unity and attributes of God, and to the reality of a future state of retribution. Such the language which it speaks, not in Greece only, or at Rome, but in every age and in every clime. Common to all nations, this language must have been derived from a common source; must have been dictated by nature, or rather by the God of nature; by Him who created the soul. But you will say, perhaps, that these exclamations, which burst, as it were, involuntarily from the lips, are not the result of a consciousness in the soul of its Divine Author, impressed upon it by himself; but are merely habitual modes of speech, used in common conversation, almost without meaning, and transmitted either by written or oral tradition. Be it so. Whence then were they derived by the man who first used them? The notion must have been conceived in the soul, before it was delivered to the tongue, or committed to Avriting. To account for the general use of these expressions, by saying that they have been handed down by written tradition, is in fact to trace them to God himself: for the earliest writings in the world are the Jewish Scriptures, of which the authors were divinely inspired. It matters little whether we say that this consciousness |136 was impressed immediately by God upon the soul, or that the soul acquired it through the medium of his revealed "Word."

The confirmation which the natural testimony of the soul affords to the truth of Christianity was evidently 11 a favourite topic with Tertullian. He urges the same argument in the 12 Apology: and Milner, in his History of the Church, though little disposed to think highly of our author, admits that he "scarce remembers a finer observation made by any author in favour both of the natural voice of conscience, and of the patriarchal tradition of true religion; for both may fairly be supposed concerned."

In the short preface to the Tract of which we have |137 been speaking, Tertullian assigns the cause of his frequent recurrence to this mode of reasoning. To press the enemies of the Gospel with arguments drawn from profane literature was, he says, useless; though they allowed the premises, they were always ready with some pretext for evading the legitimate conclusion. To bring forward arguments founded on Scripture was still more unavailing; they did not admit its authority. How then were they to be convinced, or at least silenced? 13 By an appeal to the testimony borne to the existence of one supreme God, by the natural voice of Conscience and by the works of Creation. To this testimony, therefore, Tertullian appeals: and in thus appealing, far from thinking that he could be accused of pursuing a course derogatory to the honour, or injurious to the interests of the Gospel, he conceived that he was offering the strongest evidence in confirmation of its truth; by showing that the revelation, which God has been pleased to make of himself, in his visible works and in the soul |138 of man, is in perfect harmony with that contained in his written word.

But though approved, as we have seen, by Milner, Tertullian's reasoning will be far, we suspect, from commanding universal assent in the present day. Since the publication of Dr. Ellis's work, entitled "The Knowledge of Divine things from Revelation," it has become the fashion with many to treat, not merely as vain and idle, but even as presumptuous and almost impious, every attempt to prove the existence and attributes of God from the visible works of Creation, or from the internal constitution of man. "Unless," we are told, "the idea of a God had in the first instance been communicated to the mind; unless God had himself taught it to our first parents, and it had thus been transmitted through succeeding generations; no contemplation of the works of creation----no induction from the phenomena of the natural and moral world, could ever have enabled mankind to discover even his existence. But as soon as we are taught that there is a Creator necessarily existent and of infinite perfection, our understandings readily admit the idea of such a Being; and we find in the natural world innumerable testimonies to the truth of the doctrine."

Now we are ready to grant, that man never did by reasoning a posteriori discover the existence of God; or 14 in Warburton's words, that "all religious knowledge of the Deity and of man's relation to him was revealed, and had descended traditionally down (though broken |139 and disjointed in so long a passage) from the first man." Still this concession does not, in our estimation, affect the only important part of the question; which is not, whether man ever did, without previous intimation of a Supreme Being, reason from the works of Creation to the existence of a Creator; but whether, if he had so reasoned, he would have reasoned correctly.

When, however, it is affirmed that man not only never did, but never could so have reasoned, we must be permitted to examine the arguments by which the assertion is supported. Why then could not man discover the existence of God from the contemplation of the works of creation, &c.? "Because, it is said, between matter and spirit, things visible and invisible, time and eternity, beings finite and beings infinite, objects of sense and objects of faith, the connection is not perceptible to human observation." And we are, therefore, to conclude that, unless we had been taught that there is a spiritual, invisible, eternal, infinite Being, we never could have arrived at the knowledge of that Being. Yet the same writers contend that the fact is no sooner proposed, than it commands the assent of the understanding. What then are the grounds on which that assent is given? The mere statement cannot alone be sufficient to produce conviction. The truth is, that the understanding assents, because the fact proposed agrees with our previous observations---- with the previous deductions of reason. Reason tells us that there are in the nature of man faculties for the existence of which we cannot account by any modification of matter known to us----thought, memory, |140 invention, judgment. Reason tells us that no bounds can be set to time or space----hence we are led to admit the existence of a spiritual, eternal, infinite Being. The reasoning is equally valid, whether we apply it in confirmation of a fact which has been revealed to us, or without any previous revelation infer that fact from it. The latter is doubtless by far the more difficult operation: but we are now speaking only of its possibility or impossibility. The 15 same series of proofs by which we establish a known truth, might surely have conducted us to the knowledge of that truth.

Let us suppose a sceptic to ask why we believe the existence of God: what must be our reply? According to the writers whose opinions we are now considering: "This truth was originally made known by revelation." But if the sceptic proceeded to deny, as he probably would, the authority of the revelation, by what arguments must we endeavour to convince him? The answer is, "We must necessarily refer him to those testimonies, which the natural and moral phenomena of the world abundantly supply, of a Creator all-wise, powerful, good." It is admitted then by the very answer that those testimonies are sufficient to prove to the sceptic the existence of God; and is not this in fact to give up the point in dispute?

Perhaps, however, there may be some who will foresee this inevitable consequence of referring the sceptic to testimonies drawn from the natural and |141 moral world; and will answer, "We can prove the authority of the revelation by historical investigation. We possess certain records, the genuineness of which we have ascertained; these declare that at a certain time a revelation was made from Heaven; and that the person who was sent to make it, attested the truth of his mission by miracles." Perhaps the sceptic will reply, that no human testimony can establish the credit of a miracle. How is this objection to be answered but by a reference to the natural world? by showing that what we call the course of nature, from which a miracle is said to be a deviation, is in fact only a system appointed by the God of nature; and consequently liable to be suspended or altered according to his pleasure? Or perhaps the sceptic may say, that pretensions to miraculous powers have abounded in all ages; and that, as such pretensions have in the majority of instances been shown to be false, we may reasonably conclude that they were so in all. To meet this objection, we must refer to the criteria of miracles, which are all deductions of human reason; and show that the purposes, for which the miraculous powers are said to have been exerted, were consonant to just conceptions of the Divine Nature and Attributes: and those conceptions derived from sources extraneous and independent of the Revelation itself. For we must not, in the first instance, say, that we obtain the knowledge of the nature and attributes of God from a revelation, and then prove the truth of that revelation by a reference to the knowledge so obtained. |142 

But is not this, it will be asked, to constitute human reason the judge of the Divine dispensations? Is it not to say that man, blind and ignorant man, can certainly determine what ought and what ought not to proceed from God? By no means. It is only to compare one set of facts with another; to compare the conceptions of the Divine nature, which we derive from the perusal of the Bible, with those which we derive from the contemplation of the phenomena of the natural and moral world. If the written word and the visible world both proceed from the same Author, they cannot but agree in the testimony which they bear to his character and attributes.

Men, it is true, have not unfrequently been induced by the love of paradox, by the desire of obtaining a reputation for superior talent and acuteness, or by other motives of a similar description, to assert the all-sufficiency of human reason, and to deny the necessity of a revelation. Hence many good and pious Christians have run into the opposite extreme, and been disposed to regard all, who have recourse to reason and the light of nature in the investigation of religious truth, as little better than infidels, puffed up with a presumptuous conceit of their own knowledge, and sitting in judgment on the fitness of the Divine procedure. Yet what just ground is there for these heavy accusations? Is not reason the gift of God? Does not the light of nature emanate from the Author of nature? from Him who is the fountain of light? In what then consists the presumption of endeavouring to trace the Divine character and operations, by means |143 of that light which God has himself supplied? The knowledge of divine things, which we acquire by the proper exercise of our various faculties on the phenomena of the visible world, is as strictly the gift of God, as that which we derive from the perusal of his revealed word.

Warburton, in the 2nd and 3rd Chapters of the third Book of the Doctrine of Grace, has pointed out, with his usual acuteness, the causes in which the existing disposition to undervalue and condemn the argument a posteriori originated. In their endeavours to defend our holy religion, divines, instead of taking their stand upon the firm basis of truth, have been too apt to shift their ground, and think opinions right in proportion as they were further removed from those of the adversary with whom they were immediately contending. Hence they have continually run into extremes; sometimes exalting human reason above all due bounds; at other times as unjustly depreciating it. In the seventeenth century, fanaticism was the error against which the clergy had principally to contend; and in order to place themselves at the greatest possible distance from it, they took every opportunity of launching forth into the praises of human reason, and asserting its sufficiency to the discovery of divine truth; till the Gospel at length came to be spoken of as a mere republication of the religion of nature. The infidel was not slow in availing himself of the advantage which such unguarded expressions afforded him; and began to deny the necessity of revelation, under the pretence that natural religion |144 was sufficient for every purpose. Our divines again took the alarm; and, instead of endeavouring to mark out the precise bounds of reason and revelation, saw no better mode of extricating themselves from the difficulty, than by running into the opposite extreme, and decrying natural religion with as much vehemence as their predecessors had extolled it.----To return to Tertullian.

We have seen his opinion respecting the testimony, borne by the soul of man, to the unity and attributes of God, and to a future state. Let us now examine his sentiments respecting the soul itself, which are detailed in the 16 Treatise de Anima. After the body or flesh 17 of Adam had been formed out of the 18 dust of the earth, God breathed into his nostrils the 19 breath of life, and man became a living soul. Man, therefore, is composed of two parts, sa_rc and yuxh_, Caro and 20 Anima, flesh and soul; and the term soul, according |145 to Tertullian, includes both the vital and intellectual principles, the latter of which was afterwards distinguished by the name nou~j, Animus or Mens. He describes 21 nou~j or Animus, as co-existent and consubstantial with the soul, yet distinct from it, as a minister or deputy is from his principal; being the instrument by which the soul acts, apprehends, moves. For that the pre-eminence, principalitas, is in the soul, Anima, not in the mind, Animus, is evident from the language of common life. We 22 say that a rich man feeds so many souls, not so many minds; that a dying man breathes out his soul, not his mind; that Christ came to save the souls, not the minds of men. |146 

"The 23 Scriptures then," Tertullian proceeds, "prove, in opposition to Plato, that the soul has a beginning. They prove also, in opposition to the same philosopher, that the soul is corporeal." 24 On this last point great difference of opinion existed; some philosophers maintaining, with Cleanthes, that, as there could be no mutual action of things corporeal and things incorporeal upon each other, and as the soul and body certainly do act upon each other, the soul must be corporeal. 25 Plato, on the contrary, contended, that every body must be either animale, animated by a soul, in which case it will be set in motion by some internal action; or inanimale, not animated by a soul, in which case it will be set in motion by some external action; but the soul falls under neither of these classes, being that which sets the body in motion. To this Tertullian replies, that undoubtedly the soul can neither be called animale nor inanimale; still it is a body, though sui generis. It is itself set in motion by external action; when, for instance, it is under the influence of prophetic inspiration; and it sets bodies in motion, which it could not do if it were not a body. Plato further argued that the modes, in which we arrive |147 at the knowledge of the qualities of things corporeal and things incorporeal, are perfectly distinct. The knowledge of the former is obtained through the bodily senses, sight, touch &c.; of the latter, of benevolence for instance, or malevolence, through the intellectual senses: the soul, therefore, is incorporeal. Tertullian denies the correctness of this distinction; and contends, on the contrary, that, as the soul is advertised of the existence of things incorporeal, of sounds, colours, smells through the medium of the corporeal senses, the fair inference rather is, that the soul is corporeal. "Still it must be allowed that the soul and body have each its peculiar sustenance the latter is supported by meat and drink: the former by wisdom and learning." Here Tertullian appeals to  26 medical authority; and contends that corporeal aliment is necessary also to the well-being of the soul, which would sink without it. Study does not feed, it only adorns the soul: not to mention, he adds, that the Stoics affirmed the arts and sciences to be corporeal. 27 His last argument is drawn from the Scriptures, which speak of the torments endured by the soul of the rich man, when in a state of separation from the body----in that intermediate state in which the soul remains until the general resurrection. But if the |148 soul can suffer, it must be corporeal; were it not corporeal, it would not have that whereby it could suffer. 28 Nor let it be argued that the soul is incorporeal, because it is invisible; all bodies have not the same properties; that of invisibility is peculiar to the soul. But though invisible to the eye of sense, it is visible to the eye of the spirit; for 29 St. John, when in the Spirit, beheld the souls of the martyrs. The specimens already produced will give the reader a sufficiently accurate idea of the arguments, by which the parties in this dispute supported their respective opinions; we will, therefore, proceed at once to state Tertullian's conclusion. 30 He ascribes to the soul 31 a peculiar character or constitution,boundary,length, breadth, height, and figure. This conclusion he confirms by the testimony of a Christian female, who was favoured with a vision, in which the soul was exhibited to her in a corporeal shape, and appeared a spirit; not however an empty illusion, but capable of being grasped by the hand, soft, and transparent, and of an aethereal colour, and in form agreeing exactly with the human form. For when God breathed into Adam the breath of life, that breath, being diffused through every part and member of his body, produced an interior man corresponding in all respects to the exterior.

Having shown that the soul is corporeal, 32 our author proceeds to maintain that it is simple and uncom-pounded; in opposition to certain philosophers, who |149 distinguished between the soul and the spirit, Anima and Spiritus, and made the latter a different substance from the former; the soul being according to them the vital principle, the principle by which men live---- the spirit, that by which they breathe. Anatomists, they said, inform us that moths, and ants, and gnats, have no organs of respiration; they have the vital without the breathing principle; those principles are consequently distinct. 33 But Tertullian will not allow that we can thus reason from an insect to a human being. In the nature of man, life and breath are inseparable. The distinction, therefore, between Anima and Spiritus, is only a distinction of words, similar to that between Lux and Dies, the light and the day. The spirit or breath is an act or operation of the soul: the soul breathes. 34 We must not, however, be led astray by the mere sound of words, and confound the spirit, which from the very birth of man is inseparably united to his soul, with the spirit of God and the spirit of the devil, which, though they act upon the soul, are extraneous to it.

The 35 simplicity of the soul necessarily implies that it is indivisible. When, therefore, the philosophers |150 talk of the parts of the soul, they speak inaccurately: they should say powers, or faculties, or operations, as of moving, acting, thinking, seeing, hearing, &c. Because different parts of the body are, as it were, allotted to the different senses, we must not suppose that the case is the same with the soul: on the contrary, the soul pervades the whole frame; as in the hydraulic organ of Archimedes one breath pervades the whole machine, and produces a variety of sounds. 36 With respect to the seat of the soul, the part of the body in which the principle of vitality and sensation peculiarly resides, to_ h(gemoniko_n, principale, Tertullian places it in the heart; grounding his opinion upon those passages of Scripture, in which man is said to think, to believe, to sin, &c. with the heart.

While, however, Tertullian denies that the soul is divisible into parts, he 37 admits Plato's distinction respecting its rational and irrational qualities! though he explains the distinction in a different manner. The soul of Adam, as created by God and in its original and natural state, was rational. The irrational qualities were infused by the devil, when he seduced our first parents into transgression. Plato applied the terms qumik_n and e0piqumhtiko_n to the irrational qualities of the soul; but, says Tertullian, there is a |151 rational, as well as irrational, indignation and desire; indignation at sin, and desire of good.

The 38 credit due to the testimony of the senses was a question on which great diversity of opinion existed among the philosophers. 39 The Platonists contended that no credit can be given to them, because in many instances their testimony is at variance with fact. Thus a straight oar immersed in the water appears bent----a parallel row of trees appears to converge to a point----the sky in the horizon appears to be united to the sea. The state of natural philosophy in Tertullian's days did not enable him to give a correct explanation of these appearances; yet he seems to reason correctly, when he says that, as causes can be assigned why the appearances should be such as they are, they constitute no ground for rejecting the testimony of the senses. To persons suffering from a redundancy of gall all things taste bitter; but the true conclusion is, that the body is diseased, not that the sense of taste is fallacious. Tertullian, however, does not rely solely upon reasoning: he points out the fatal consequences to the Gospel, which will follow from admitting the notion of the Platonists. If we cannot trust to the testimony of the senses, what grounds have we for believing that Christ either lived, or wrought miracles, or died, or rose again?

Closely 40 connected with this notion respecting the |152 fallacy of the senses was the notion that the soul, so long as it is united to the body, cannot attain to the 41 knowledge of the truth; but must be involved in the maze of opinion and error. The business, therefore, of the wise man is to abstract the mind from the senses, and to raise it to the contemplation of those invisible, incorporeal, divine, eternal ideas, which are the patterns of the visible objects around us. Doubtless, answers Tertullian, the distinction between things corporeal and things spiritual, things visible and things invisible, is just; and the soul arrives at the knowledge of them through different channels; being conversant with the one by means of the senses, with the other by means of the mind or intellect. But the knowledge obtained through the latter source is not more certain than that obtained through the former.

In 42 opposition to those who affirmed the soul of the infant is 43 destitute of intellect, which they supposed to be subsequently introduced----Tertullian contends, that all the faculties of the soul are coexistent with it; though they are afterwards more or less perfectly developed in different individuals, 44 according to the different circumstances of birth, health, education, condition of life. But observing the great variety of intellectual and moral characters in the world, we are apt to conclude that it arises from some difference in the original constitution of the soul; whereas that is |153 always the same, though it is afterwards modified by external circumstances. This remark is particularly directed against the 45 Valentinian notion that different seeds, material, animal, or spiritual, are introduced into the souls of men after their birth; whence arise the diversities of character discernible among them. One necessary inference from this notion is, that the character of the individual is immutably determined by the nature of the seed infused into his soul: whether good or bad, it must always remain so. Our author, on the contrary, argues, that the character of God alone is immutable, because He alone is self-existent: the character of a created being must be liable to change, and will depend upon the use which he makes of the freedom of his will----a freedom which he derives from nature. Tertullian, however, was far from intending to assert the sufficiency of man to form within himself by the mere exercise of his free-will a holy temper and disposition; 46 he expressly states that the freedom of the will is subject to the influence of Divine Grace. The following may be taken as a correct representation of his meaning. The character of man is not irrevocably fixed, as the Valentinians affirm, by any qualities infused into his soul subsequently to his birth. The diversities of character observable in different individuals, and in the same individual at different times, must be referred to the operation of |154 external circumstances, and to the different degrees in which Divine Grace influences the determinations of the will.

Tertullian 47 now recapitulates all that he has said on the subject of the soul; and affirms that it derives its origin from the breath of God----that it is 48 immortal; corporeal; that it has a figure; is simple in substance; possessing within itself the principle of intelligence operating in different ways (or through different channels); endued with free-will; affected by external circumstances, and thus producing that infinite variety of talent and disposition observable among mankind; rational; designed to rule the whole man; possessing 49  an insight into futurity. Moreover, the souls of all the inhabitants of the earth are derived from one common source, the soul of Adam.

This 50 last point he proceeds to establish by first refuting Plato's notions respecting the origin and pre-existence of the soul.----According to him, Plato said that the souls of men are continually passing to and fro between heaven and earth; that they originally existed in heaven with God, and were there conversant with those eternal ideas of which the visible things |155 below are only the images. Hence during their residence on earth they do not acquire any new knowledge; but merely recall to their recollection what they knew in heaven, and forgot in their passage from heaven to earth. Plato further argued, that the heavenly powers, 51 the progeny of God, who were entrusted by him with the creation of man, and received for that purpose an immortal soul,  52 froze around it a mortal body. 53 In refuting these notions, Tertullian argues principally upon the inconsistency of Plato; who, at the same time that he makes the soul self-existent, and places it almost on an equality with the Deity, yet supposes it capable of forgetting what passed in a previous state. 54 He alludes also to another philosophical notion, that the soul is introduced into the foetus after its birth; being inhaled as it were when the infant first draws breath, and exhaled when man dies. 55 This notion he conceives to be sufficiently refuted by the experience of every pregnant woman. 56 His own opinion is, that the soul and body are conceived together; the womb of the mother being impregnated at the same time by their respective seeds, which, though different in kind, are from the first |156 inseparably united. I must omit the arguments by which he supports this opinion. They are of such a nature that he feels himself obliged to apologize for them, by saying that, as the business of a controversialist is to establish his point, he is sometimes under the necessity of sacrificing modesty to truth. The conclusion is, that when God formed Adam out of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, the seeds of the body and soul were inseparably united together in him; and have been derived, in the same state of union, from him to his posterity. Thus Tertullian establishes his position, that the souls of all mankind are derived from one common source, the soul of Adam.

Quitting 57 Plato, Tertullian now passes to the Pythagorean doctrine of the Metempsychosis. I will mention one of his arguments against this doctrine, on account of the information which it supplies respecting the height to which cultivation and civilization were then carried. 58 "If the doctrine of the Metempsychosis." he says, "is true, the numbers of mankind must always remain the same; there can be no increase of population; whereas we know the fact to be otherwise. So great is the increase, that, although we are continually sending out colonies, and penetrating into new regions, we cannot dispose of the excess. Every country is now accessible to the traveller and the merchant. Pleasant farms now smile, where formerly were dreary and dangerous wastes----cultivated fields now occupy |157 the place of forests----flocks and herds have expelled the wild beasts----sands are sown----rocks are planted ----marshes are drained----and where once was a single cottage, is now a populous city. "We no longer speak with horror of the savage interior of the islands, or of the dangers of their rocky coasts; everywhere are houses, and inhabitants, and government, and civilized life. Still our population continually increases, and occasions fresh grounds of complaint: our numbers are burthensome to the world, which cannot furnish us with the means of subsistence: such is our state that we no longer look upon pestilence, and famine, and wars, and earthquakes, as positive evils, but as remedies provided by Providence against a greater calamity----as the only means of pruning the redundant luxuriance of the human race." Professor Malthus himself could not have lamented more feelingly the miseries resulting from an excess of population; or have pointed out with greater acuteness the natural checks to that excess.

I shall omit 59 Tertullian's other arguments against the doctrine of the Metempsychosis, as well as his observations respecting 60 the difference of the sexes in the human species; 61 the state of the foetus in the womb; 62 the growth of the soul to maturity; and 63 the corruption of human nature: to his remarks, however, on the last of these topics I shall hereafter have occasion to refer. The next subject of which he |158 treats is 64 sleep. Having stated the opinions of the different philosophers, he prefers that of the Stoics, who defined sleep----65 a temporary suspension of the activity of the senses. 66 Sleep he conceives to be necessary only to the body; the soul, being immortal, neither requires nor even admits a state of rest. In sleep therefore, 67 when the body is at rest, the soul, which never rests, being unable to use the members of the body, uses its own; and the dreamer seems to go through all the operations necessary to the performance of certain acts, though nothing is performed. 68 Tertullian admits that there are well authenticated accounts of persons whenever dreamed in the course of their lives. 69 Suetonius says that this was the case with Nero: and 70 Theopompus, with Thrasymedes. Our author mentions also the story of 71 Hermotimus; of whom it was recorded that when he slept, his soul entirely abandoned and wandered away from his body: in this state (his wife having revealed the secret) his body was seized by his enemies, who burned it; and his soul, returning too late, found itself deprived of its habitation. 72 |159 Tertullian does not attempt to reconcile these phenomena with his theory of the perpetual activity of the soul; but says that we must receive any solution of them, rather than admit that the soul can be separated from the body, except by death:----or that the soul can sink into a state of absolute rest, which would imply its mortality. 73 We have seen that Tertullian applies the word ecstasis----which he interprets 74 Excessus sensus amentiae instar----to the state of the prophet's mind, when under the influence of inspiration. He applies the same term to the state of the soul when dreaming; 75 and evidently supposes that the knowledge of future events was frequently communicated to it in dreams. 76 Some dreams, he adds, proceed from God; others from daemons; others are suggested by intense application of the mind to a particular subject; others again are so utterly wild and extravagant, that they can scarcely be related, much less accounted for or interpreted: these last are to be ascribed peculiarly to the ecstatic influence.

From 77 sleep, the image of death, Tertullian passes to death itself; which he defines the separation of the soul from the body. 78 "When we say," he continues, "that death is natural to man, we speak with reference, not to his original nature as given him by his Maker: but to his actual nature as polluted by sin. Had Adam continued in his state of innocence, this |160 separation of the soul from the body would never have taken place. Sin introduced death, which even in its mildest form is a violence done to our nature; for how can the intimate union between the body and soul be dissolved without violence?" 79 After this separation from the body, the souls of the mass of mankind descend to the parts below the earth; there to remain until the day of judgment. The souls of the martyrs alone pass not through this middle state, but are transferred immediately to heaven.

Tertullian 80 proceeds to inquire whether the soul, after it has once passed into the lower parts of the earth, can leave them and revisit these upper regions. This question he determines in the negative; arguing principally from the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. But the daemons, who are continually labouring to seduce us into error, though they cannot call up the soul after death, yet can practise illusions upon the senses, and by presenting themselves under human forms, persuade men that they are the ghosts of persons deceased. Thus Saul was persuaded that he saw and conversed with Samuel. In like manner, Tertullian refers to the agency of demons the deceptions practised by the dealers in magic; who generally affected to call up the spirits of such persons as had come to an untimely end: taking advantage of the popular superstition, that the souls of men, cut off by a violent death, hover about the earth until the period has elapsed to which, had |they not been so cut off, their lives would have been extended. |161 

But 81 in what state, it may be asked, does the soul remain during its abode in the lower parts of the earth? Does it sleep? "We have seen," answers Tertullian, "that sleep is an affection of the body, not of the soul. When united to the body, the soul does not sleep; much less, when separate from the body. No: the righteous judgments of God begin to take effect in this intermediate state. The souls of the good receive a foretaste of the happiness, and the souls of the wicked of the misery, which will be assigned them as their everlasting portion, at the day of final retribution."

Such are Tertullian's speculations upon the origin, nature, and destiny of the soul. Should the examination of them have appeared somewhat minute and tedious, it must be remembered that the only mode of putting the reader in possession of the state of philosophy in any age is to exhibit to him the questions which formed the subjects of discussion, and the manner in which they were discussed. The result of the examination must, we think, be deemed favourable to our author's character for talent and ingenuity. Many of the questions proposed may appear trifling---- many of his arguments weak and inconclusive; the questions, however, are not more trifling, nor the arguments more inconclusive, than those which occur in the writings of the most celebrated philosophers of antiquity. It would be the extreme of absurdity |162 to compare the writings of Plato and Tertullian, as compositions; but if they, are considered as specimens of philosophical investigation, of reasoning and argument, he who professes to admire Plato will hardly escape the charge of inconsistency, if he thinks meanly or speaks contemptuously of Tertullian.

In further illustration of our author's philosophical opinions, we shall proceed briefly to state his notions respecting the nature of angels and daemons. 82 He asserts, in the first place, that there are spiritual substances, or material spirits: this is not denied even by the philosophers. 83 These spiritual, or angelic substances were originally created to be the ministers of the Divine will; but some were betrayed into transgression. Smitten with the beauty of the 84 daughters of men, they descended from heaven, 85 and imparted many branches of knowledge, revealed to themselves, but hitherto hidden from mankind:----the properties of metals----the virtues of herbs----the powers of enchantment----and the arts of divination and astrology. |163 Out of complaisance also to their earthly brides, they communicated the arts which administer to female vanity:----of polishing and setting precious stones----of dyeing wool----of preparing cosmetics.

From86 these corrupt angels sprang daemons; a still more corrupt race of spirits, whose actuating principle is hostility against man, and whose sole object is to accomplish his destruction. This they attempt in various ways; but as they are invisible to the eye, their mischievous activity is known only by its effects. They nip the fruit in the bud; they blight the corn; and, as through the tenuity and subtlety of their substance they can operate on the soul as well as the body, while they inflict diseases on the one, they agitate the other with furious passions and ungovernable lust. 87 By the same property of their substance they cause men to dream. 88 But their favourite employment is, to draw men off, from the worship of the true God, to idolatry. 89 For this purpose they lurk within the statues of deceased mortals; 90 practising illusions upon weak minds, and seducing them into a belief in the divinity of an idol. 91 In their attempts to deceive mankind, they derive great assistance from the rapidity with |164 which they transport themselves from one part of the globe to another. They are thus enabled to know and to declare what is passing in the most distant countries; so that they gain the credit of being the authors of events of which they are only the reporters. It was this peculiarity in the nature of daemons which enabled them to communicate to the Pythian priestess what Croesus was at that very moment doing in Lydia. In like manner, as they are continually passing to and fro through the region of the air, they can foretell the changes of the weather; and thus procure for the idol the reputation of possessing an insight into futurity. When by their delusions they have induced men. to offer sacrifice, 92 they hover about the victim; snuffing up with delight the savoury steam, which is their proper food. The daemons employed other artifices in order to effect the destruction of man. 93 As during their abode in heaven they were enabled to obtain some insight into the nature of the divine dispensations, they endeavoured to preoccupy the minds of men, and to prevent them from embracing Christianity; by inventing fables bearing some resemblance to the truths |165 which were to become the objects of faith under the Gospel. Thus they invented the tales of the tribunal of Minos and Rhadamanthus in the infernal regions; of the river Pyriphlegethon, and the Elysian Fields; in order that when the doctrines of a future judgment, and of the eternal happiness and misery prepared for the good and wicked in another life, should be revealed, the common people might think the former equally credible, the philosopher equally incredible, with the latter.

As the purpose for which the angels were created was 94 to execute the commands of God, they who retain their original purity still 95 occupy themselves in observing the course of human affairs and fulfilling the duties allotted them:----thus, one angel is especially appointed to preside 96 over prayer; another 97 over baptism; another 8 to watch over men in their dying moments, and as it were to call away their souls; 98 another to execute the righteous judgments of God upon wicked men. Tertullian states also, on the authority of Scripture, that it is a part of their office to appear occasionally to men; in which case, according to him, |166 they assume, not only the human form, 99 but the human body itself; by a peculiar privilege of their nature, which enables them to create it out of nothing. It is worthy of observation that Tertullian, while he assigns to each angel a particular office or department----as prayer, baptism----uses a different language with respect to daemons; 100 assigning to each individual his attendant daemon: thus he accounts for the story of the 101 Daemon of Socrates.

I will conclude this chapter by a few remarks on Gibbon's representation of the opinions entertained by the primitive Christians respecting daemons. "It was," 102 he says, "the universal sentiment both of the Church and of heretics, that the daemons were the authors, the patrons, and the objects of idolatry." That Tertullian ascribed to them the two former characters is manifest from the foregoing statement of his opinions They were the authors of idolatry; because every evil deed, every evil thought of man is the result of their corrupt suggestions; and it was consequently by their instigation that he was first drawn aside from his allegiance to the one true God, and induced to offer his adorations to the creature instead of the Creator. They were the |167 patrons; because they promoted its cause by practising illusions upon the senses of mankind, and thus confirming their belief in the divinity of the idol. But they were not, at least in Tertullian's estimation, the objects. 103 He expressly says, that the objects of idolatry were dead men; who were conceived to be gods, on account of some useful invention by which they had contributed to the comfort and well-being of man in his present life. 104 The daemons were content to lead man into error and to feed upon the savoury steam arising from the sacrifices; without attempting to propose themselves as the immediate objects of worship.


[Footnotes have been moved to the end]

1. 1 Idem (Socrates) et quum aliquid de Veritate sapiebat, Deos negans, &c. Apology, c. 46. Taceo de Philosophis, quos, superbia severitatis et duritia disciplinae ab omni timore securos, nonnullus etiam afflatus Veritatis adversus Deos erigit. Ad Nationes, L. i. c. 10. De Anima, c. 2.

2. 2 Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? quid Academiae et Ecclesiae? quid

Haereticis et Christianis? Nostra institutio de porticu Solomonis est, qui et ipse tradiderat Domimim in simplicitate cordis esse quaerendum. Viderint qui Stoicum, et Platonicum, et Dialecticum Christianismum protulerunt. Nobis curiositate opus non est post Christum Iesum, nec inquisitione post Evangelium. De Praescriptione Haeretic. c. 7. He traces the origin of all the heresies by which the peace of tbe Church was disturbed to the heathen philosophy: Ipsae denique haereses a Philosophia subornantur. Ibid. Cum Philosophis----Patriarchis, ut ita dixerim, Haereticorum. De Anima, c. 3. See also c. 18, and the Apology, c. 47.

3. 3 De Anima, c. 2. Nonnunquam et in tenebris aditus quidam et exitus deprehenduntur caeca felicitate.

4. 4 Compare the Apology, c. 46.

5. 5 Consiste in medio, Anima, seu divina et aeterna res es, secundum plures philosophos, eo magis non mentiens; seu minime divina, quoniam quidem mortalis, ut Epicuro soli videtur, eo magis mentiri non debens; seu de coelo exciperis seu de terra conciperis; seu numeris, seu atomis concinnaris; seu cum corpore incipis, seu post corpus induceris; unde unde et quoquo modo hominem facis animal rationale, sensus et scientiae capacissimum, c. 1. In c. 4. are briefly enumerated the opinions of the different philosophers respecting the state of the soul after death.

6. 6 c.6.

7. 7 In the third volume of his Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels, recently published at Cambridge in the United States, Mr. Andrews Norton has, in a very ingenious and learned note, entered into an examination of the uses of the words Qeo_j and Deus by Heathen writers. He refers particularly to the Treatise de Testimonio Animae, and to the appeal made by Tertullian to the popular use of the word Deus in the singular number, as showing a natural consciousness in men of the one God. He observes that Tertullian, and the other Fathers who made this appeal, scarcely believed that the commonalty among the heathens, when they used such expressions as Quod Deus dederit, Quod Deus voluerit, had in their thoughts a distinct conception of the one God, but regarded those expressions as an instinctive recognition, not well understood by those who uttered them, of a truth originally stamped upon the soul. Tertullian's argument may therefore be thus stated. "In this recognition of a Divine Power by which events are ordered, and which is not referred by you to any one of the gods which you ordinarily worship, there is evidence of that conception of the Divinity which belongs to the nature of the soul." This appears to be a correct account of Tertullian's reasoning.

8. 8 c. 3.

9. 9 c. 4.

10. 1 cc. 5, 8.

11. 2 Compare De Anima, c. 41. De Carne Christi, c. 12. De Resurrectione Carnis, c. 3. Adv. Marcionem, L. i. c. 10.

12. 3 c. 17. I insert the whole chapter as highly deserving the reader's attention. Quod colimus Deus unus est, qui totam molem istam cum omni instrumento elementorum, corporum, spirituum, verbo quo jussit, ratione qua disposuit, virtute qua potuit, de nihilo expressit in ornamentnm majestatis suae, unde et Graeci nomen mundo ko&smon accommodaverunt. Invisibilis est, etsi videatur; incomprehensibilis, etsi per gratiam repraesentetur; inaestimabilis, etsi humanis sensibus aestimetur; ideo verus et tantus est. Caeterum quod videri communiter, quod comprehendi, quod aestimari potest, minus est et oculis quibus occupatur, et manibus quibus contaminatur, et sensibus quibus invenitur. Quod vero immensum est, soli sibi notum eat; hoc est quod Deum aestimari facit, dum aestimari non capit. Ita eum vis magnitudinis et notum hominibus objicit et ignotum. Et haec est summa delicti nolentium recognoscere quem ignorare non possunt. Vultis ex operibus ipsius tot ac talibus quibus continemur, quibus sustinemur, quibus oblectamur, etiam quibus exterremur----vultis ex animae ipsius testimonio comprobemus? quae licet carcere corporis pressa, licet institutionibus pravis circumscripta, licet libidinibus et concupiscentiis evigorata, licet falsis Diis exancillata, quum tamen resipiscit, ut ex crapula, ut ex somno, ut ex aliqua valetudine, et sanitatem suam potitur, Deum nominat, hoc solo nomine, quia proprio Dei veri. Deus magnus, Deus bonus, et quod Deus dederit, omnium vox est. Judicem quoque contestatur illum. Deus videt, et Deo commendo, et Deus mihi reddet. O testimonium animae naturaliter Christianae! Denique pronuntians haec, non ad Capitolium, sed ad coelum respicit. Novit enim sedem Dei vivi; ab illo et inde descendit.

13. 4 The following are selected from numerous passages in which Tertullian appeals to this testimony. Tractandum et hic de revelationis qualitate, an digne cognitus sit (Deus), ut constet an vere; et ita credatur ease, quem digne constiterit revelatum. Digna enim Deo probabunt Deum. Nos definimus Deum primo natura cognoscendum, dehinc doctrina recognoscendum. Natura, ex operibus; doctrina, ex praedicationibus. Adv. Marc. L. i. c. 18. Compare L. ii. c. 3. Adv. Valentinianos, c. 20. Denique ante legem Moysi scriptam in lapideis tabulis, legem fuisse contendo non scriptam, quae naturaliter intelligebatur et a Patribus custodiebatur. Nam unde Noe Justus inventus, si non illum naturalia legis justitia praecedebat? Adv. Judaeos, c. 2. De Virginibus Vel. cc. I. 16. Nos unum Deum colimus, quern omnes naturaliter nostis; ad cujus fulgura et tonitrua contremiscitis: ad cujus beneficia gaudetis. Ad Scapulam, c. 2. Si enim anima, aut divina aut a Deo data est, sine dubio datorem suum novit. De Testim. Animae, c. 2. Quum etiam ignorantes Dominum nulla exceptio tueatur a poena, quia Deum in aperto constitutum, et vel ex ipsis coelestibus bonis comprehensibilem ignorari non licet, quanto cognitum despici periculosum est! De Poenitentia, c. 5. De Spectaculis, c. 2. De Corona Militia, c. 6. Ad Nationes, L. ii. c. 5.

14. 5 Doctrine of Grace, Book iii. c. 2. Warburton is speaking in the person of an opponent of Natural Religion.

15. 6 To borrow an illustration from science. For how long a period were the ablest mathematicians employed in endeavouring to effect the passage from finite to infinite, or from discrete to continuous, in geometry? The discovery was at length made, and therefore was at all times possible.

16. 7 We have seen that our author wrote a distinct Treatise on the Origin of the Soul, de Censu Animae, against Hermogenes, who contended that it was formed out of matter. Chap. i. p. 46.

17. 8 c. 3. See, concerning the creation of man, de Resurrectione Carnis, cc. 5. 7.

18. 9 Tertullian supposes the earth out of which man was made, to have been in a humid state, having been lately covered with water. De Baptismo, c. 3. Adv. Valentinianos, c. 24. Adv. Hermogenem, c. 29. Qui tunc de limo formari habebat. Adv. Praxeam, c. 12. De limo caro in Adam. De Anima, c. 27. For a definition of the body, see de Resurrectione Carnis, c. 35.

19. 1 This breath Tertullian sometimes calls the substance of God. A rationali scilicet artifice non tantum factus (homo), sed etiam ex substantia ipsius animatus. Adv. Praxeam, c. 5. Compare adv. Marc. L. ii. cc. 5, 6. Quoquo tamen, inquis, modo substantia Creatoris delicti capax invenitur, quum afflatus Dei, id est, anima, in homine deliquit. c. 9. The objection here stated was urged, not only by the Marcionites, but also by Hermogenes. See de Anima, c. 11.

20. 2 Tertullian sometimes uses the word Spiritus to designate the Soul. See de Baptismo, cc. 4, 5. De Poenitentia, c. 3. Siquidem et caro et Spiritus Dei res; alia manu ejus expressa; alia afflatu ejus consummata. De Spectaculis, c. 2. Et tamen et corpore et spiritu desciit a suo institutore. In another passage in the same tract, c. 13, Spiritus and Anima are joined together, and appear to be synonymous, unless the former means the breath. Quae non intestinis transiguntur, sed in ipso Spiritu et Anima digeruntur. See also c. 17. sub fine, and de Anima, cc. 10, 11. Tertullian uses the expression, Spiritus animalis. De Anima, c. 53. But generally Tertullian uses the word Spiritus to designate the Holy Spirit; the communication of whose influence constitutes the Spiritual Man, pneumatiko_j, in contradistinction from the animal man, yuxiko&j. Qui nou tantum animae erant, verum et spiritus, c. 26. See c. 35. In c. 41. we find the Spirit clearly distinguished from the soul. Sequitur animam nubentem Spiritui caro, ut dotale mancipium, et jam non animae famula, sed Spiritus. Using the word Spiritus in this sense, he calls the soul suffectura Spiritus (Quia suffectura est quodammodo Spiritus Anima. Adv. Marc. L. i. c. 28.) the substance on which the Spirit acts, or its instrument; and in the Tract de Resurrectione Carnis, c. 40. he says, that the inward man is renewed per suggestum Spiritus. See also de Monogamia, c. 1.

21. 3 Proinde et animum, sive mens est, nou~j apud Graecos, non aliud quid intelligimus, quam suggestum animae ingenitum et insitum et nativitus proprium, quo agit, quo sapit, quem secum habens ex semetipsa se commoveat in semetipsa. c. 12. Again, in the same chapter, near the end. Nos autem animum ita dicimus animae concretum, non ut substantia alium, sed ut substantiae officium. Again in c. 18. Putabis quidem abesse animum ab anima, siquando animo ita afficimur, ut nesciamus nos vidisse quid vel audisse, quia alibi fuerit animus: adeo contendam, immo ipsam animam nec vidisse nec audisse, quia alibi fuerit cum sua vi, id est, animo. De Resurrectione Carnis, c. 40. Porro Apostolus interiorem hominem non tam animam, quam mentem atque animum intelligi mavult, id est, non substantiam ipsam, sed substantiae saporem.

22. 4 c.13.

23. 5 c. 4.

24. 6 c. 5. Tertullian also ascribes a body to the Spirit. Licet enim et animae corpus sit aliquod, suae qualitatis, sicut et spiritus. Adv. Marc. L. v. c. 15. See also c. 10. Et si habet aliquod proprium corpus anima vel spiritus, ut possit videri corpus animale animam significare, et corpus spiritale Spiritum: and adv. Praxeam, c. 7. Quis enim negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus Spiritus est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie. He remarks in general, Omne, quod est, corpus est sui generis; nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est. De Carne Christi, c. 11. Nisi fallor enim, omnis res aut corporalis aut incorporalis sit necesse est; ut concedam interim esse aliquid incorporale de substantiis duntaxat, quum ipsa substantia corpus sit rei cujusque. Adv. Hermogenem, c. 35. 

25. 7 c. 6.

26. 8 Soranus, the physician, whom Tertullian quotes by name, appears to have been a materialist, and to have maintained the mortality of the soul.

27. 9 c. 7. Compare de Resurrectione Carnis, c. 17. There is, however, some variation in Tertullian's language on this subject. In the Apology, c. 48. he speaks as if the soul could not suffer when separated from the body: Ideoque repraesentabuntur et corpora, quia neque pati quicquam potest anima sola sine stabili materia, id est, carne. See also de Testimonio Animae, c. 4.

28. 1 c. 8.

29. 2 Apoc. vi. 9.

30. 3 c. 9.

31. 4 The Latin word is "habitum."

32. 5 c. 10, 11.

33. 6 In c. 19, Tertullian distinguishes between the Vital Principle in man, and in all other created things. Denique arbores vivere, neo tamen sapere, secundum Aristotelem, et si quis alius substantiam animalem in universa communicat, quae apud nos in homine privata res est, non modo ut Dei opus quod et caetera, sed ut Dei flatus quod haec sola, quam dicimus cum omni instructu suo nasci.

34. 7 Erunt enim et alias Spiritus species, ut ex Deo, ut ex Diabolo, c. 10. Compare c. 18. Ob haec ergo praestruximus neque animum aliud quid esse, quam animae suggestum et structum: neque spiritum extraneum quid quam quod et ipsa per flatum. Caeterum accessioni deputandum, quod aut Deus postea, aut Diabolus adspiraret.

35. 8 c. 14.

36. 9 Compare de Res. Carnis, c. 15, from which it appears that some placed the h9gemoniko_n in the brain, or in the space between the eyebrows. The ancient anatomists appear to have instituted experiments for the purpose of ascertaining the seat of the soul, by removing those parts of the body in which it has been usually supposed to reside. Their conclusion was, that nothing certain could be pronounced upon the subject; since choose what part you will as the seat of the soul, animals or insects may be found, in which the vital principle remains, after that part is removed.

37. 1 c. 16.

38. 2 c. 17.

39. 3 In the Tract de Corona, c. 5. Tertullian calls the senses the instruments of the soul, by which it sees, hears, &c. Compare the first Tusculan, c. 20. or 46.

40. 4 c. 18.

41. 5 The distinction between Scientia and Opinio must be familiar to all who are acquainted with Cicero's Philosophical Writings.

42. 6 cc. 19, 20, 21.

43. 7 In other words, that the infant possesses the vital, but not the intellectual, principle.

44. 8 Compare cc. 24 and 38.

45. 9 Compare c. 11.

46. 1 Haec erit vis Divinae Gratiae, potentior utique natura, habens in nobis sub-jacentem sibi liberam arbitrii potestatem, quod au0tecou&sion dicitur, quae quum sit et ipsa naturalis atque mutabilis, quoquo vertitur, natura convertitur. Inesse autem nobis to_ au0tecou&sion naturaliter, jam Marcioni ostendimus et Hermogeni, c. 21.

47. 2 c. 22. Definimus Animam, Dei flatu natam, immortalem, corporalem, effigia-tam, substantia simplicem, de suo sapientem, varie procedentem, liberam arbitrii, accidentiis obnoxiam, per ingenia mutabilem, rationalem, dominatricem, divinatricem, ex una redundantem. Tertullian considers the soul to be the source of sensation and perception. Opinor sensualis est animae natura. Adeo nihil animale sine sensu, nihil sensuale sine anima. Et ut propius dixerim, animae anima sensua est. Igitur quum omnibus anima sentire praestat, &c. De Carne Christi, c. 12.

48. 3 Immortal in its own nature. Compare de Res. Carnis, cc. 18, 34, 35.

49. 4 Tertullian here speaks of a natural insight into futurity; not of the spirit of prophecy, which is derived from the grace of God. See cc. 24, 41.

50. 5 c. 23.

51. 6 Genimina Dei.

52. 7 Mortale ei circumgelaverint corpus. Plato's words are, qnhto_n sw~ma au0toi\ perieto&rneusan. In Timaeo, tom. iii. p. 69. ed. Serr.

53. 8 c. 24.

54. 9 c. 25. Perinde animam, extraneam alias et extorrem uteri, prima aspira-tione nascentis infantis adduci, sicut exspiratione novissima educi.

55. 1 Respondete, matres, vosque praegnantes, vosque puerperae; steriles et masculi taceant; vestrae naturae veritas quaeritur, vestrae passionis fides convenitur, an aliquam in foetu sentiatis vivacitatem alienam de vestro? de quo pal-pitent ilia, micent latera, tota ventris ambitio pulsetur, ubique ponderis regio mutetur? &c. c. 25.

56. 2 c. 27.

57. 3 c. 28.

58. 4 c. 30.

59. 5 He occupies eight chapters from c. 28 to c. 36 in the discussion of this doctrine, and in proving that Simon Magus and Carpocrates founded some of their heretical notions upon it.

60. 6 c. 36.

61. 7 c. 37.

62. 8 c. 38.

63. 9 cc. 39, 40, 41.

64. 1 cc. 42, 43.

65. 2 Resolutionem sensualis vigoris.

66. 3 Compare de Res. Carnis, c. 18. Arctius dicam, ne in somnum quidem cadit Anima cum corpora, ne tum quidem sternitur cum carne. Etenim agitatur in somnis et jactitatur; quiesceret autem si jaceret.

67. 4 c. 45. We have seen in what sense Tertullian ascribes members to the soul.

68. 5 c. 44.

69. 6 In Nerone, c. 46.

70. 7 See Plutarch, de Defectu Oraculorum, c. 50.

71. 8 See Pliny, Hist. Nat. L. vii. c. 52. Plutarch, de Daemonio Socratis, c. 22. calls him Hermodorus.

72. 9 He says that the effect of fasting upon himself was, not to make him sleep without dreaming (such an admission would have been fatal to his theory): but to make him so dream that he was not conscious of having dreamed. Jejuniis autem nescio an ego solus plurimum ita somniem, ut me somniasse non sentiam, c. 48:----a subtle distinction. 

73. 1 Chap. 1. p. 2, note 4.

74. 2 c. 45.

75. 3 c. 46.

76. 4 c. 47.

77. 5 cc. 50, 51.

78. 6 c. 52.

79. 7 c. 55.

80. 8 cc. 56, 57.

81. 9 c. 58. Compare de Res. Carnis, c. 17. and the 40th of King Edward's Articles. Qui animas defunctorum praedicant usque ad diem judicii absque omni sensu dormire, aut illas asserunt una cum corporibus mori, et extremo die cum illis excitandas, ab Orthodoxa Fide, quae nobis in Sacris Literis traditur, prorsus dissentiunt.

82. 1 Apology, c. 22. Atque adeo dicimus esse substantias quasdam Spiritales; nec nomen novum est. Sciunt daemones Philosophi, Socrate ipso ad daemonii arbitrium expectante . . . daemones sciunt Poetae; et jam vulgus indoctum in usum maledicti frequentat .... Angelos quoque etiam Plato non negavit. See also adv. Marcionem, L. ii. c. 8. Sed adflatus Dei generosior Spiritu Materiali, quo Angeli constiterunt. Apology, c. 46. Quum secundum Deos Philosophi Daemones deputent. De Anima, c. 1.

83. 2 Nos officia divina Angelos credimus. De Anima, c. 37. Apology, c. 22. De Idololatria, c. 4.

84. 3 In proof of the alleged intercourse between the angels and the daughters of men, Tertullian appeals to Genesis vi. 2. de Virgin, vel. c. 7. and to the apocryphal book of Enoch. De Cultu Foeminarum, L. i. c. 3.

85. 4 De Cultu Foeminarum, L. i. c. 2. L. ii. cc. 4, 10. De Idololatria, c. 9. Apology, c. 35. Ista quae a Deo non sunt, auctore naturae, sic a Diabolo esse intelliguntur, ab interpolatore naturae. De Cultu Foeminarum, L. i.

86. 5 Apology, c. 22. Compare de Spectaculis, c. 2.

87. 6 De Anima, cc. 47, 49. Apology, c. 23.

88. 7 Apology, cc. 23. 27. Compare de Idololatria, cc. 3, 4, 15.

89. 8 De Spectaculis, cc. 10, 12, 13, 23, where Tertullian ascribes the invention of the games and scenic exhibitions to the daemons. Apol. I. c. 21.

90. 9 The illusions practised by the professors of magic were, according to our author, peculiarly the work of daemons; when for instance the object of the incantation was to raise a dead man from the grave, a daemon presented himself under the figure of the deceased. De Anima, c. 57, where the miracles performed by Pharaoh's magicians are mentioned. See p. 160.

91. 1 Apology, c. 22.

92. 2 Haec enim daemoniorum pabula sunt. Ad Scapulam, c. 2.

93. 3 Apology, c. 22. Dispositiones etiam Dei, et tunc Prophetis concionantibus exceperunt et nunc lectionibus resonantibus carpunt. c. 21. Sciebant qui penes vos fabulas ad destructionem veritatis istius aemulas praeministraverunt. c. 47. Omnia adversus veritatem de ipsa veritate constructa sunt, operantibus aemulationem istam Spiritibus erroris. Ab his adulteria hujusmodi salutaris disciplinae subornata; ab his quaedam etiam fabulae immissae, quae de similitudine fidem infirmarent veritatis, vel eam sibi potius evincerent: ut quis ideo non putet Christianis credendum, quia nec Poetis nec Philosophis: vel ideo magis Poetis et Philosophis existimet credendum, quia non Christianis, &c. See also de Praescriptione Haereticorum, c. 40. and some very fanciful instances in the Tract de Spectaculis, c. 23. See also de Anima, c. 2. Quando et pseudoprophetarum meminerimus, &c.

94. 4 See n. 2, p. 162. The word Angel, as Tertullian remarks, is descriptive, not of a nature, but an office. Angelus, id est, nuntius; officii, non naturae vocabulo. De Carne Christi, c. 14.

95. 5 De Spectaculis, c. 27. Dubitas enim illo momento, quo in Diaboli Ecclesia fueris, omnes Angelos prospicere da coelo, et singulos denotare, &c.?

96. 6 Angelo adhuc Orationis astante. De Oratione, c. 12. 7 Angelus Baptismi Arbiter. De Baptismo, c. 6.

97. 8 De ipsius statim Angeli facie, Evocatoris animarum, Mercurii Poetarum. De Anima, c. 53, sub fine.

98. 9 Et judex te tradat Angelo Executionis, et ille te in carcerem mandet infernum. De Anima, c. 35.

99. 1 Adv. Marcionem, L. iii. c. 9. De Carne Christi, cc. 3, 6. Igitur quum relatum non sit unde sumpserint carnem, relinquitur intellectui nostro non dubitare, hoc esse proprium Angelicae potestatis ex nulla materia corpus sibi sumere.

100. 2 Nam et suggessimus nullum pene hominem carere daemonio. De Anima, c. 57.

101. 3 Apology, c.46. Sane Socrates facilius diverse Spiritu agebatur; si quidem aiunt daemonium illi a puero adhaesisse, pessimum revera paedagogum. De Anima, c. I. See also cc. 25, 39.

102. 4 Chap. xv. p. 463. Ed. 4to.

103. 5 Quando etiam error orbis propterea Deos praesumpserit, quos homines interdum confitetur, quoniam aliquid ab unoquoque prospectum videtur utilitatibus et commodis vitae. Adv. Marcionem, L. i. c. 11. See also the Apology, cc. 10, 11. De Idololatria, c. 15.

104. 6 See de Corona, c. 10, where Tertullian is exposing the absurdity of placing crowns on the heads of Idols: Sed vacat totum, et est ipsum quoque opus mortuum, quantum in idolis; vivum plane quantum in daemoniis, ad quae pertinet superstitio. To crown an idol, the ostensible object of worship, is useless; since it can have no enjoyment of the fragrance or beauty of the flowers. The daemons alone (who lurk within the idols) profit by these superstitious practices.

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