2 Ps. ix., cxi., and cxxxviii., Deut. vi. 5, and Matt. xxii. 37.

3 [The distinction between corporeal and incorporeal substance is one that Augustin often insists upon. See Confessions VII. i-iii. The doctrine that all substance is extended body, and that there is no such entity as spiritual unextended substance, is combatted by Plato in the Theatetus. For a history of the contest and an able defence of the substantiality of spirit, see Cudworth's. Intellectual System, III. 384 sq. Harrison's Ed.-W.G.T.S.]

4 Invenire.

5 Inventa.

6 [This ternary of memory, understanding, and will, is a better analogue to the Trinity than the preceding one in chapter IX- namely, mind, knowledge, and love. Memory, understanding, and will have equal substantiality, while mind, knowledge, and love have not. The former are three faculties, in each of which is the whole mind or spirit. The memory is the whole mind as remembering; the understanding is the whole mind as cognizing; and the will is the whole mind as determining. The one essence of the mind is in each of these three modes, each of which is distinct from the others; and yet there are not three essences or minds In the other ternary, of mind, knowledge, and love, the last two are not faculties but single acts of the mind. A particular act of cognition is not the whole mind in the general mode of cognition. This would make it a faculty. A particular act of loving, or of willing, is not the whole mind in the general mode of loving, or of willing. This would make the momentary and transient act a permanent faculty. This ternary fails, as we have noticed in a previous annotation (IX. ii. 2), in that only the mind is a substance.

The ternary of memory, understanding, and will is an adequate analogue to the Trinity in respect to equal substantiality. But it fails when the separate consciousness of the Trinitarian distinctions is brought into consideration. The three faculties of memory, understanding, and will, are not so objective to each other as to admit of three forms of consciousness, of the use of the personal pronouns, and of the personal actions that are ascribed to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It also fails, in that these three are not all the modes of the mind. There are other faculties: e. g., the imagination. The whole essence of the mind is in this also.-W.G.T.S.]

1 Col. iii. 10.

2 2 Cor. iv. 16.

3 Gen. xxx. 37-41.

4 Coactus.

5 Cogitatio.

6 Rom. xii. 2.

7 Ecclus. xxxix. 16.

8 Gen. iii. 5.

9 Vid. Retract. Bk. II. c. 15, where Augustin adds that it is possible to love the bodily species to the praise of the Creator, in which case there is no "estrangement."

10 Matt. xxii. 13.

11 Psalms cxx., and following.

12 Isa. v. 18.

13 [Augustin's map of consciousness is as follows: (1). The corporeal species=the external object (outward appearance). (2). The sensible species=the sensation (appearance for the sense). (3). The mental species in its first form=present perception. (4). The mental species in its second form=remembered perception. These three "species" or appearances of the object: namely, corporeal, sensible, and mental, according to him, are combined in one synthesis with the object by the operation of the will. By "will," he does not mean distinct and separate volitions: but the spontaneity of the ego-what Kant denominates the mechanism of the understanding, seen in the spontaneous employment of the categories of thought, as the mind ascends from empirical sensation to rational conception.

The English translator has failed to make clear the sharply defined psychology of these chapters, by loosely rendering "sentire," "to perceive," and "cogitare" to think.-W.G.T.S.]

14 Vid. Retract. 11. xv. 2. [Augustin here says that when he wrote the above, he forgot what is said in Leviticus xi. 20, of "fowls that creep, going upon all four, which have legs above their feet to leap withal upon the earth."-W.G.T.S.]

15 Wisd. xi. 21.