191 Nemes., ch. 21.

192 fantastiko/n.

193 Or, presented.

194 See Aristotle, De anima, III. c.7.

195 Nemes., ch. 71.

196 Nemes., ch. 9.

197 Ibid., ch. 8.

198 chro/n is added in some mss. but wrongly: for it is what is percived by touch alone that is here spoken of, whereas, below, we are told that dryness is recognised also by sight; so also in Nemesius.

199 Nemes., ch. II.

200 Greg. Nyss., De opif. Hom., ch. 13.

201 Text, ai!tion. R. 2930, a0ggei=on.

202 fantasi/a.

203 kai\ noh/sewj is wanting in some mss., nor is it found in Nemesius, who borrowed his description from Origen.

204 Text, swthri/a. Variant, swrei/a, a heaping up, "coacervatio." Faber has "confirmatio," which is nearer swthri/a, conservatio, which is found in Nemesius, &c.

205 Nemes., ch. 13.

206 to\ fantastiko/n, the faculty of fantasy.

207 Cf. I Cor. i. 10.

208 Max. ad Marin. et ad Incert. p.98.

209 to\ boulhto/n.

210 Max. Dial. cum Pyrrh. et Epist. I ad Marin.

211 Thomas Aquinas (I-2, Quaest. 4, a. I and 2) lays down the position in accordance with John of Damascus, that there is no "counsel" in God quatenus est appetitus inquisitivus, but that there is quantum ad certitudinem judicii. Basil (Hexaem. Hom. I), arguing against the ancient philosophers who taught that the world was made a0proaire/twj, affirms "counsel" in God in the latter sense.

212 Max., Epist. I ad Marin.

213 Text, o9 de\ Qeo\j pa/nta ei0dw\j a9plw=j, ou0 bouleu/etai. Various reading is, o9 de\ Qeo\j pa/nta ai9dw\j a9plw=j bou/letai.

214 Max., Dial. cum Pyrrh.

215 dio\ ou0de\ gnwmiko\n ei\xe qe\lhma.

216 gnwmh\n.

217 u. infr., lib. iii. ch. 14.

218 Or, personalities.

219 Text, qelhto/n, as given by Faber. Variant, qelhtiko/n.

220 to\ gnwmiko\n qe/lhma, the will of individual opinion, or, the dispositional will.

221 Or, acting by opinion, or disposition.

222 Anast. Sin. in Odhg., from Greg. Nyss., p. 44; Clem. Alex. ap. Max., p. 151

223 The Greek e0nergei/a being a term with a large connotation is explained as meaning in different cases operation (operatio), action (actio), and act (actus). Nemesius defines actio a operatio rationalis, actus as perfectio potentiae.

224 Cf. Anast. Sin. in !Odhgo/j, p 43; John of Dam., Dialect. c. 30; Greg. Nyss., in Maximus, II., p. 155.

225 pra/ceij. So pra=cij is defined as e0nergeia logikh/ in the following chapter.

226 ta\ pa/qh. Cf. Instit. Elem., c. 9; Greg. Nyss., Cont. Eunom., v. p. 170.

227 Max., Dial. cum Pyrrh.

228 Greg. Nyss. ap. Max., p. 155.